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In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned to quantitative 
research methods to understand the impact of transitional justice on 
societies emerging from periods of violence and repression. The term 
transitional justice (TJ) has been used to describe a range of tools that 
countries use to address past (and increasingly contemporary) human 
rights abuses. With some variation, observers often distinguish at 
least seven different types of transitional justice mechanisms: 
prosecutions, truth commissions, vetting procedures, reparations, 
memorialization, traditional practices, and institutional reform.1 
Although some would dispute labeling them a TJ mechanism, 
amnesties are another policy tool with clear societal implications. To 
date, quantitative studies of TJ impact have focused primarily on 
trials, truth commissions, and amnesties. These are the mechanisms 
that are most frequently discussed in policy debates as to how to 
build lasting peace in post-conflict societies. They often have a higher 
profile and possess higher stakes for political elites. Arguably, these 
TJ mechanisms also are the easiest to identify due to media attention 
                                                 
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel Rothenberg. The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict 
Justice. (Chicago: The International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University, 
2008).  
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and the legal trail they leave behind. Hence, they are the most 
amenable to constructing large datasets. 
The growth in quantitative scholarship is a response to 
dissatisfaction with much of the early qualitative transitional justice 
literature. Several observers have noted the need for basing claims 
about the impact of transitional justice on more solid empirical 
foundations.2 In the early qualitative literature, many judgments about 
the value of TJ were based upon impressionistic conclusions and 
anecdotal evidence. In other cases, authors made claims based upon 
legal or moral arguments rather than empirical evidence. Moreover, 
much of this early literature was written by TJ practitioners who had 
an inherent interest in seeing a particular outcome to the research.3 
The quantitative research seeks to address these shortcomings by 
assembling large datasets of TJ events that span space and time and 
employing ostensibly more objective, methodologically rigorous 
research designs.  
Existing empirical quantitative research often treats TJ 
mechanisms as independent variables and assesses their impact on 
dependent variables such as human rights, democracy, and peace 
duration. Much of this quantitative literature makes bold policy 
recommendations. Yet, the first wave of research offers relatively 
little clear guidance to governments and societies emerging from 
periods of conflict and repression, intergovernmental organizations 
and global civil society that frequently help devise TJ plans, or 
                                                 
2 Eric Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and 
Impact,” International Studies Perspectives 8.1 (2007): 16-35; David Mendeloff, 
“Deterrence, Norm Socialization, and the Empirical Reach of Kathryn Sikkink's 
The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World 
Politics,” Journal of Human Rights 11.2 (2012): 289-295; Hugo van der Merwe, 
Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds., Assessing the Impact of Transitional 
Justice (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009);  
Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of 
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 
4.3 (2010): 1-26. 
3 Michael Ben-Josef Hirsch, Megan Mackenzie, and Mohamed Sesay, “Measuring 
the Impacts of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Placing the Global ‘Success’ 
of TRCs in Local Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict 47.3 (2012): 386-403. 
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governments and private donors in the Global North that often fund 
these initiatives. Part of the problem involves explaining statistical 
findings to a constituency that may have little to no statistical 
training. For those more statistically inclined, however, 
methodological challenges are apparent. Quantifying key concepts 
and devising statistical models that provide a fair assessment of 
potential cause-effect relationships is difficult. This has led some 
observers to conclude that even the most advanced quantitative 
research leaves much to be desired.4 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
quantitative research having a greater impact on TJ policy discussions 
is that, collectively, the policy advice is inconsistent if not downright 
contradictory. What are policymakers and activists to make of this 
messiness? 
In this article, we critically review the first wave of this 
emerging quantitative literature that examines the impact of TJ 
mechanisms. We find divergence on several methodological issues 
that help to explain the different conclusions reached by these 
studies, including sampling strategies, model construction, and the 
measurement of key variables. Furthermore, these studies have often 
failed to provide compelling theoretical or empirical bases for a 
causal relationship between TJ mechanisms and dependent variables 
such as democracy and human rights. We suggest several ways in 
which quantitative scholars could produce findings with broader 
credibility. Although we support the use of quantitative methods to 
understand the impact of TJ mechanisms, greater methodological 
care is needed in supporting policy recommendations.  
 
Reviewing the Findings of the “First Wave” Quantitative 
Literature 
In the past decade, there has been a rapid expansion in the amount of 
transitional justice research that employs quantitative research 
methods. Some research treats transitional justice as the dependent 
                                                 
4 Anna MacDonald, “From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us 
about Local Experiences of Transitional Justice,” Transitional Justice Review 1.3 
(2015): 72-121; Thoms et al, “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice,” 1-26. 
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variable, others as the independent variable. Within the latter 
literature that explores the effects of TJ, one can roughly divide 
research based on the unit of analysis. Some quantitative research 
focuses on the individual level, examining data on the reaction to TJ 
by victims or mass publics and how TJ processes have shaped 
individual attitudes toward other groups, human rights, democracy, 
and the like.5 In this article, we concern ourselves with quantitative 
research that examines the impact of TJ at the national, or societal, 
level.  
In our review, we focus on the first wave of the quantitative 
TJ literature, which ended in roughly 2011. As we shall illustrate, this 
research has looked at a variety of TJ mechanisms and examined their 
impact on a range of societal dimensions. We focus on studies that 
examine the effect of TJ on human rights, democracy, and peace 
duration, the three most common dependent variables in the 
quantitative literature. Furthermore, we consider only those studies 
that have been published in peer-reviewed outlets or that have been 
released for attribution by their authors. As such, our review 
underrepresents the use of quantitative methods as we do not include 
the many conference papers and doctoral dissertations that were 
produced during this first wave. In short, we review the most 
prominent early studies, most of which are the product of major 
database initiatives. Collectively, this emerging body of research does 
not provide decisive policy prescriptions. In fact, there is a lack of 
consensus as to whether or not particular TJ policies generally 
produce benefits for society. It is likely that the methodological 
challenges partially responsible for this divergence also are part of the 
                                                 
5 David Backer, “Victims' Responses to Truth Commissions: Evidence from South 
Africa” in M. Ndulo, ed., Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the Wars End 
(London: University College London, 2007); James Gibson, “The Contributions of 
Truth to Reconciliation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 409-432; James L. 
Gibson, “The Legacy of Apartheid: Racial Differences in the Legitimacy of 
Democratic Institutions and Processes in the New South Africa,” Comparative 
Political Studies 36.7 (2003): 772-800; James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can 
Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).  
4
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reason why more of this research has yet to appear in peer-reviewed 
outlets. 
 
Surveying the Findings 
Several studies have reached pessimistic conclusions regarding the 
effects of particular types of TJ mechanisms. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for 
example, focuses specifically on truth commissions.6 Building his 
truth commission dataset from Hayner, the United States Institute of 
Peace, and news reports, he explores their role in promoting human 
rights and democracy.7 Using a global sample of countries over the 
years from 1980 to 2006, he finds that truth commissions have a 
negative effect on human rights and no effect on democracy. 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm utilizes a multi-method research design that seeks 
to gain the best of quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
Unfortunately, his case study findings are not entirely consistent with 
his statistical results, leaving the reader to wonder whether his cases 
are not representative of truth commissions in general or if there are 
weaknesses in the statistical model. 
Melander focuses on amnesties, which many see as an 
obstacle to justice.8 Specifically, he assesses whether amnesty 
provisions in peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005 make 
peace more or less durable. He finds that amnesties reduce the risk of 
renewed fighting in authoritarian regimes because, he argues, the 
greater stability and insulation provided to autocrats make them more 
immune to pressures to renege on the amnesty. By contrast, 
amnesties do not have a pacifying effect in democracies or regimes in 
transition. In either scenario, the results are not positive on 
normative grounds: either justice is foregone or armed conflict 
resumes. 
                                                 
6 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on 
Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010).  
7 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New 
York: Routledge, 2001).  
8 Erik Melander, “Justice or Peace? A Statistical Study of the Relationship between 
Amnesties and Durable Peace,” JAD-PbP Working Paper No. 4: 2009.  
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Meernik, Nichols, and King consider the effects of 
prosecuting human rights violators before domestic and international 
courts.9 They focus on examining the effect of prosecution on 
human rights practices and the durability of peace in countries that 
emerged from civil war between 1982 and 2007. Their findings do 
little to support the strong claims of either trial supporters or critics. 
In fact, they conclude that countries that experience trials are no 
more or less likely to experience a recurrence of intrastate conflict or 
improvements in human rights practices compared to countries in 
which prosecutions have not occurred. According to Meernik et al., 
trials do not risk renewed violence, but neither do they necessarily 
cement peace or promote human rights. 
Other research looks at a combination of TJ mechanisms. 
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, for instance, explore the consequences of 
trials, truth commissions, and amnesties for subsequent human rights 
practices and democratization processes in countries transitioning to 
democracy between 1970 and 2004.10 In examining the individual and 
interactive effects of these three TJ policies, they reach interesting 
conclusions. First, they find that trials or amnesties alone do not have 
a statistically significant effect on improving human rights or 
democracy. Second, in line with Wiebelhaus-Brahm, they find that 
truth commissions on their own have a negative effect on human 
rights.11 Third, only when trials and amnesties are used together do 
they have a positive effect on human rights and democracy. They 
conclude that this approach is effective by balancing demands for 
accountability with perpetrators’ needs for security. In those 
situations where both trials and amnesties exist, they find that truth 
commissions do not have a negative effect. 
                                                 
9 James D. Meernik, Angela Nichols, and Kimi L. King, “The Impact of 
International Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights after 
Civil War,” International Studies Perspectives, 11.3 (2010): 309-334.  
10 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in 
Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2010).  
11 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies. 
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Of the quantitative studies we examine, Lie, Binningsbø, and 
Gates offer the most expansive study in terms of TJ-related 
mechanisms included.12 They examine trials, purges, reparations to 
victims, truth commissions, amnesties, and the use of exile. They 
consider the effects of these mechanisms on the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence in countries in which a civil war, as defined by Uppsala-
PRIO’s armed conflict dataset, ended between 1946 and 2003. 
Overall, they conclude that TJ processes have a weak and 
inconsistent effect on the durability of peace. Trials appear to be the 
most important type of justice, though the effect of trials is sensitive 
to the mode of conflict termination. The other interesting finding is 
that amnesty reduces peace duration, but, as with trials, the effect of 
this variable also is sensitive to conflict termination, indicating that 
conflict termination clearly affects the prospect for justice as well as 
post-conflict peace duration. 
By contrast, other research finds that transitional justice has a 
clearer positive benefit for societies emerging from conflict or 
repression. Kim and Sikkink test the alleged deterrent effect of 
prosecuting human rights violators.13 In other words, can trials 
promote human rights? They include a range of trial processes, 
including those conducted by domestic courts; in foreign courts 
under universal jurisdiction principles; and international courts, which 
encompass the International Criminal Court, ad-hoc international 
tribunals, and hybrid courts. They examine the effect of trials on 
human rights with a sample of countries that have undergone a 
transition from authoritarian rule, civil war, or state creation between 
1974 and 2004. According to Kim and Sikkink, “the mechanisms 
through which transitional justice measures influence human rights 
do not only involve a calculation of the possibility of punishment, but 
                                                 
12 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø and Scott Gates, “Post-Conflict 
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191, Post-
Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 5: 2007.  
 
13 Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of 
Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” International Studies 
Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939–963. 
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also respond to processes that provide information and communicate 
norms.”14 By this line of reasoning, human rights trials and truth 
commissions help to spread a norm of accountability that makes 
human rights abuses socially atrocious; as a result, violations decline. 
Building on this logic, they code a dichotomous variable for trial 
activity in a given year. Their data source, US State Department 
human rights reports, does not permit measuring the number of trials 
that take place so they simply measure the presence or absence of 
trial activity in a given year. Moreover, they do not distinguish 
between whether the target of prosecution is a high-level official or 
someone from the lower ranks. Although they devote relatively little 
attention to them theoretically, the article also explores whether truth 
commissions have a deterrent effect. Contrary to Wiebelhaus-
Brahm15 and Olsen et al.16, they find that both truth commissions and 
human rights prosecutions have a positive impact on lessening 
repression. Moreover, countries that have had more years of 
prosecutions have better human rights practices than countries with 
fewer.  
 
Summing It Up 
Collectively, the aforementioned research offers convoluted policy 
prescriptions. In terms of amnesties, Lie et al.17 and Melander18 argue 
they promote peace if implemented by authoritarian regimes; the 
reverse is true for democratic countries. At the same time, according 
to Olsen et al.19, amnesties promote human rights and democracy, 
though only if balanced with trials. With respect to trials, the answer 
truly is that “it depends”. Kim and Sikkink20 are optimistic about the 
                                                 
14 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 953-954; also see Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011).  
15 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
16 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
17 Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.” 
18 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”.  
19 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
20 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”  
8








105   Quantitative Transitional Justice Research 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133 
 
ability of trials to promote human rights, while Lie et al. and Meernik 
et al.21 suggest we should not hope for too much. Olsen et al. tell us 
that democracy and human rights will advance furthest where trials 
are balanced by amnesties. Finally, the truth commission conclusions 
are the most obviously contradictory. While Kim and Sikkink argue 
they promote human rights, Wiebelhaus-Brahm22 and Olsen et al. 
find the opposite.  
 
Making Sense of the Divergent Findings 
Several factors help to explain these divergent findings. We highlight 
three major issues that are the result of using quantitative methods. 
The first issue relates to definition and measurement of key concepts. 
In particular, studies have defined transitional justice mechanisms in 
different ways, resulting in a lack of consistency on what cases are 
included. As we have seen, these studies also vary in what dependent 
variable they use. While they may be concerned with different areas 
of impact, more general conclusions about the utility of particular TJ 
mechanisms may implicitly follow. Second, these studies have drawn 
their samples in different ways. Some look at cases of democratic 
transition, others post-civil war, or both. The time period covered 
also varies considerably. As a result, the TJ and non-TJ cases in the 
studies’ samples are not necessarily the same. In other words, the 
cases upon which these causal claims are tested are not identical 
across studies. Finally, scholars have constructed their statistical 
models in different ways. It is important to explore whether the 
models chosen are appropriate for testing causal claims and whether 
they have done a reasonable job of addressing concerns such as 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias. 
 
Definitional and Measurement Issues 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
In general, statistical research has treated transitional justice 
mechanisms as dummy variables. In other words, they have been 
                                                 
21 Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”  
22 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
9
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coded as ones and zeroes to reflect the presence or absence of a TJ 
mechanism. One can reasonably question whether it is appropriate to 
treat all trials (or truth commissions, amnesties, etc.) as being the 
same for theory testing. Trials certainly vary on many dimensions, 
including how many trials occur; who is on trial; whether the process 
is free and fair; and whether a conviction is reached. Truth 
commissions vary in terms of the scope of the investigative task they 
were given; the powers that were granted to compel cooperation; the 
makeup of the commissioners; and whether they produce a final 
report, to cite a few important differences. Among other things, 
amnesties differ in terms of who is eligible; and whether recipients 
are required to do anything as a precondition for receiving the 
amnesty. As we shall see, several studies under review try to address 
some of this diversity. Nonetheless, these steps are unlikely to satisfy 
some qualitative scholars, particularly those who view each TJ 
process as sui generis.   
Within the quantitative literature, there are significant 
differences in how trial processes are measured. Lie et al.23, for 
instance, do not provide explicit criteria for case selection. For Olsen, 
et al.24, a trial is coded only when a verdict is reached. They 
hypothesize that outcome, rather than process, is critical for any 
impact of trials on democracy and human rights. At the same time, 
they include in their sample trials of a diversity of suspects, including 
armed rebel groups; state agents fighting civil wars, conducting 
counterinsurgency operations, or engaging in government repression; 
and domestic political opposition groups (including those 
participating in coup attempts). This is different from Kim and 
Sikkink, who view process, rather than outcome, as important. They 
code for indictments, arrests, extraditions, detentions and trials under 
the umbrella category of human rights prosecutions. Moreover, Kim 
and Sikkink’s25 sample, unlike Olsen et al., is limited to government 
agents accused of human rights violations.  As long as the prosecution 
                                                 
23 Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.” 
24 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 32.  
25 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 948.  
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activity (as outlined in US State Department and Amnesty 
International reports) inflicts a cost on a government agent accused of 
human rights violations, it is coded.  Their definition of cost includes 
the financial costs of legislation, lost income during preventative 
detention, as well as the loss of prestige and legitimacy that 
accompanies trials.26 One commonality between these studies is that 
they lump domestic and international prosecutions into a single trial 
variable. Meernik et al.27 adopt Kim and Sikkink’s definition, but treat 
domestic prosecution and international courts as separate variables.  
Overall, Kim and Sikkink’s28 sampling strategy leads to a 
much smaller sample compared to Olsen et al.29 As illustrated in 
Appendix A, Olsen et al. have 81 countries with trials in their sample, 
while Kim and Sikkink have only 48.  While Kim and Sikkink’s 
definition is much broader in regards to what court activity 
constitutes prosecutorial activity because they determine their sample 
using the cost-inflicted standard as opposed to the verdict-only 
standard of Olsen et al., the latter include the trials of a broader range 
of actors. These contrasting sampling strategies lead to a very 
different sample base.  In total, the Kim and Sikkink and the Olsen et 
al. samples have only 36 trial countries in common.  Moreover, 
because of the different sampling strategies, the number of trial-years 
included in both datasets is very different.  
Determining which sampling strategy is most beneficial for 
testing trials as an independent variable depends in part on theoretical 
judgments about whether the impact of trials serves as a deterrent or 
as a norm generator. Coding only verdicts presumes that trial activity 
in and of itself does not have an impact on attitudes and behaviors. 
As such, by coding for verdicts only, Olsen et al.30 fail to include 
several high-profile cases in which a verdict was not reached due to 
the death of the defendant (Slobodan Milosevic and Augusto 
Pinochet, for example). Kim and Sikkink argue that their approach 
                                                 
26 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect,” 942.  
27 Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”  
28 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”  
29 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance. 
30 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
11
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indicates that trial activity deters future rights abuses through norm 
diffusion.31 Yet, it is difficult to determine if and to what extent trials 
genuinely help promote norm diffusion. As Mendeloff argues, the 
causal logic of normative-based arguments is problematic because it 
assumes that the presence of human rights prosecutions (indictments, 
arrests, trials, etc.) is a legitimate expression of the norm.32 Human 
rights trials may themselves be unjust depending on the manner in 
which they are conducted. In terms of actors subject to trials, Kim 
and Sikkink assume that human rights are promoted primarily 
through the prosecution of state agents. It is unclear how these types 
of trials would impact the behavior of non-state actors. By contrast, 
Olsen et al.’s inclusion of coup plotters introduces a range of trial 
processes not necessarily associated with TJ. More generally, neither 
study adequately accounts for differences in the quality of trial 
activity. However, these somewhat subjective judgments would be 
difficult to make for a large number of cases.  
It is particularly difficult to test normative explanations for 
quantitative findings, because how can we know that repression is 
reduced because of burgeoning human rights norms? While Kim and 
Sikkink’s findings offer an important counter-weight to some of the 
other TJ literature, the theoretical explanations for their empirical 
findings are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to empirically test.33 
By contrast, Olsen et al. may underappreciate the influence of trial 
processes.34 Indeed, both the concepts of deterrence and norm 
diffusion (as well as norm creation) are complex processes that call 
for more research; because of this, definitional choices should be 
firmly rooted in theory.  
Several of the studies under review address the impact of 
truth commissions. At least implicitly, they generally adopt Hayner’s 
definition of truth commissions as “bodies set up to investigate a past 
history of violations of human rights in a particular country – which 
                                                 
31 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”  
32 David Mendeloff, “Deterrence, Norm Socialization and the Empirical Reach.” 
 
33 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect.”  
34 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance. 
12
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can include violations by the military or other government forces or 
armed opposition forces.”35 Elsewhere, Hayner elaborates on this 
basic definition to emphasize that truth commissions are temporary 
bodies officially sanctioned by the state to examine a pattern of 
human rights abuses over a broad period of time.36 However, 
definitional challenges plague the comparative study of truth 
commissions. Given ambiguity in the meaning of key attributes like 
official sanction, whether the commissions need to be newly 
established, and what constitutes a pattern of abuse and a broad 
period of time, studies contain very different lists of truth 
commission cases. Brahm’s survey of cross-national studies found 
vastly different lists of truth commission cases (see Appendix B for a 
comparison of cases in select studies).37 
The studies under review vary significantly in how they treat 
truth commissions. Kim and Sikkink include truth commissions, but 
do not define or explain their criteria for including cases.38 Lie et al. 
do not even provide a list of cases.39 Olsen et al. use Hayner’s 
definition of truth commissions; they define a truth commission as a 
“newly established, temporary body officially sanctioned by a state or 
an international governmental organization to investigate past human 
rights abuses.”40 As is evidenced by Appendix B, however, Olsen et 
al. include many cases as truth commissions that other studies, 
including Hayner’s, do not. Olsen et al. have 68 truth commissions in 
their data, whereas Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for example, has 28 in his 
models.41 While not necessarily evidence they are wrong to do so, 
Olson et al. code for several truth commissions that others appear to 
have judged as different types of mechanisms. Some, such as Brazil’s 
                                                 
35 Priscilla B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study,” Human Rights Quarterly 16.4 (1994): 597-655. 
36 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14.  
37 Eric Brahm, “What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?” Peace and 
Conflict Review 3.2 (2009): 1-14. 
38 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.” 
39 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.” 
40 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 34.  
41 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
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1995-2007 commission, did not appear to have undertaken significant 
investigations of abuses; rather, it processed claims by victims.42 
Furthermore, Hayner’s definition includes the stipulation that the 
truth commission “investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of 
time, rather than a specific event.”43  Olsen et al. do not always 
follow their sampling criterion, as they code for some commissions 
that examine specific events rather than a pattern of abuses.44  For 
instance, they include the Investigating Commission on the 
Kidnapping and Assassination of National Representatives Zelmar 
Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz in Uruguay. We are not 
suggesting that more narrowly-construed investigations cannot 
influence such things as human rights and democracy. However, 
there has yet to be a systematic study of different types of 
investigative commissions that explores whether the type of 
investigation matters for different outcomes. 
Although in a fairly limited way, some of the studies attempt 
to account for qualitative differences in truth commissions. Olsen et 
al., for example, include any truth commission that begins its work.45 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, by contrast, adds the stipulation that the 
commission must make recommendations to redress past abuses and 
to prevent such abuses from occurring again in the future.46 In one 
model, he examines the effect of a commission’s operation by only 
coding those years in which the commission existed. He also 
measures the years following the publication of a truth commission’s 
final report to gauge longer term effects. Finally, in order to get at 
another qualitative difference, on the assumption that final reports 
are critical for their impact, he includes only cases where reports were 
                                                 
42 G. Mezarobba, “Between Reparations, Half Truths and Impunity: The Difficult 
Break with the Legacy of the Dictatorship in Brazil,” Sur: International Journal on 
Human Rights 7.13 (2010): 7-26. 
43 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14.  
44 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
45 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
46 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies. 
14








111   Quantitative Transitional Justice Research 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133 
 
publicly released. He finds that the impact of truth commissions is 
magnified if the final report is made available.47 
Furthermore, the studies that examine amnesties also fail to 
make strong qualitative distinctions. Lie et al.48 and Olsen et al.49 treat 
amnesties as dummy variables. Melander only considers amnesty 
provisions that are part of formal peace agreements.50 Otherwise, he 
also does not make qualitative distinctions among amnesties. Yet, we 
know that there is tremendous diversity among amnesties.51 
Finally, Lie et al.52 and Olsen et al.53 experiment with 
aggregating TJ experiences into one variable. For example, aside from 
treating the TJ mechanisms in their model separately, Lie et al. also 
create an additive index to distinguish where between 0 and 4 
mechanisms were used. In other words, a country in which trials, 
purges, a truth commission, and reparations have been conducted 
would be scored a 4, whereas a country that experienced trials and 
purges and another country that experienced a truth commission and 
reparations would each be coded a 2. Theoretically, it is difficult to 
make a compelling argument that these latter two TJ configurations 
are identical. By contrast, Olsen et al. construct an ordered variable to 
measure the extent to which accountability has been achieved. To do 
this, countries are scored to reflect how far along an accountability 
continuum they have moved, where amnesty=1, truth 
commission=2, and trial=3. While arguably useful if accountability is 
the most desirable dimension of TJ, other criteria might lead us to 
rank mechanisms differently. Moreover, measuring in this way 
prevents us from examining how the timing and sequencing of these 
mechanisms may shape outcomes. In general, aggregating TJ 
measures does not seem to be a very promising avenue as it requires 
                                                 
47 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 139, 159.  
48 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”  
49 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
50 Melander, “Justice or Peace?” 
51 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace 
and Justice Divide (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2008).  
52 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”  
53 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
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making questionable assumptions about ranking and aggregation and 
generally obscures valuable qualitative information. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Comparatively speaking, there is greater consensus on the measures 
used to judge the impact of transitional justice. Kim and Sikkink54, 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm55, and Olsen et al.56, for example, all use 
Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) measure of human rights, which is 
focused on physical integrity rights. Wiebelhaus-Brahm and Olsen et 
al. also use the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as a robustness check. 
Both CIRI and PTS provide countries’ human rights scores based 
upon annual human rights reports produced by the US State 
Department and Amnesty International. CIRI provides a yearly 
evaluation of countries’ protection of a range of different human 
rights, namely the rights to freedom from extra-judicial killing, 
disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment. In addition, the 
dataset contains an index of these items that measures the general 
protection of physical integrity rights.57 By contrast, the PTS provides 
a five-point measure of the degree to which physical integrity rights 
are protected by the government.58 The PTS reports two human 
rights scores, corresponding to each of the annual human rights 
reports used as a reference. The PTS has been criticized for 
                                                 
54 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”  
55 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
56 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
57 In each of these four areas, a country’s behavior is coded as follows: 0 = practice 
reported 50 or more times in the year; 1 = practice reported between 1 and 49 
times in the year; and 2 = practice not reported in the year. To construct the 
physical integrity rights score, Mokken Scaling Analysis is used, resulting in a 
measure that varies between 0 and 8. For more on CIRI’s coding, see David L. 
Cingranelli and David L.Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset 
Version 2008.03.12, Available: http://www.humanrightsdata.org [Accessed April 25 
2009]. 
58 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976-2007, 
Available at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org (Accessed April 25 2009) 
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attempting to force into one measure a multidimensional concept.59 
Moreover, the scores are based on qualitative judgments of the 
prevalence of state-sanctioned violence rather than on a strict count 
as CIRI uses. Theoretically, both measures are useful in measuring 
potential deterrent effects. They are less effective, however, in 
judging the impact of TJ on attitudes toward human rights that fall 
short of observable behavior. Moreover, both measures rely on 
organizations that may be biased in their reporting.60 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm and Olsen et al.61 also are interested in the 
effect on democratization. Wiebelhaus-Brahm focuses on Freedom 
House’s Civil Liberties measure, which he argues best measures the 
aspects of democracy that truth commissions are most likely to 
influence.62 Olsen et al., by contrast, provide little explicit reflection 
on measurement choices and whether they reasonably measure 
effects of TJ. Rather, they take an inclusive approach and include 
Polity’s measure63 as well as Freedom House’s Civil Liberties and 
                                                 
59 James M. McCormick and Neil J. Mitchell, “Human Rights Violations, Umbrella 
Concepts, and Empirical Analysis,” World Politics 49.4 (1997): 510-525; David L. 
Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of 
Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights,” International Studies Quarterly 
43.2 (1999): 407-417. 
60 For a review of some of the issues with quantitative human rights measures, see 
Todd Landman, “Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 26.4 (2009): 906-931.; Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey and Tanya C. 
Vazquez, “How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the 
US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-
1995,” Human Rights Quarterly 23.3 (2001): 650-677.; Reed M. Wood and Mark 
Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to 
CIRI,” Human Rights Quarterly 32.2 (2010): 367-400.” 
61 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
62 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 25.  
63 Polity IV bases its democracy measure on: Executive Recruitment (3.1 XRREG 
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment; 3.2 XRCOMP Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruitment; 3.3 XROPEN Openness of Executive Recruitment); The 
Independence of Executive Authority (3.4 XCONST Executive Constraints 
(Decision Rules)); and Political Competition and Opposition (3.5 PARREG 
Regulation of Participation; 3.6 PARCOMP The Competitiveness of Participation). 
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Political Rights scores.64 In reality, the causal links between any form 
of TJ and the aspects of democracy measured by these datasets are 
likely to involve one or more intervening variables. Theoretically, 
therefore, making causal arguments regarding TJ impact on these 
aspects of democracy is problematic. However, other aspects that 
might be more relevant, such as public attitudes about perpetrators, 
the extent to which voters cross group boundaries, or attitudes 
toward members of other groups in society are not widely available, 
at least not in a form amenable to cross-national research. 
                                                 
64 Freedom House “ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights 
questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped 
into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and 
Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions 
are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 
questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these 
questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 
4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The political rights section also 
contains two additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional 
monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for 
genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of 
policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the 
government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a 
country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of 
another group?). For additional discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may be 
added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be 
subtracted (the worse the situation, the more that may be subtracted). The highest 
score that can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 
for each of the 10 questions). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil 
liberties checklist is 60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). The 
scores from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the current 
year under review. In general, a score is changed only if there has been a real world 
development during the year that warrants a change (e.g., a crackdown on the 
media, the country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in the 
narrative. In answering both the political rights and civil liberties questions, 
Freedom House does not equate constitutional or other legal guarantees of rights 
with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. While both laws and actual 
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Finally, both Lie et al.65 and Melander66 use Uppsala-PRIO 
data to measure the length of the post-conflict peace period.  This 
dataset marks the presence of violent conflict when fighting crosses a 
25 battle-related death threshold. Using a 25 battle-death threshold is 
an advance over traditional ways of measuring wars as 1,000 battle-
related deaths. However, this criterion overlooks other types of 
violence, such as acts of government repression, acts of terrorism, 
domestic violence, or criminal violence that may be evidence of TJ 
impact (or lack thereof).  
 
Sampling strategies 
Consumers of this emerging quantitative research would be well-
served by paying careful attention to how these scholars craft their 
sample because it has clear implications for the scope of their 
findings. Chronological coverage is limited by data availability for the 
dependent variable. As a result, studies that assess the impact on 
human rights or democracy are generally limited to focusing only on 
the period since the 1970s. Conflict data are not so limited. 
Furthermore, scholars vary as to whether they seek to contribute to 
discussions about states transitioning to democracy, post-conflict 
societies, or both. Wiebelhaus-Brahm tries to avoid selection effects 
by using a global sample that includes countries that did not 
experience civil conflict or an attempted transition from authoritarian 
rule to democracy.67 By doing so, however, he includes many 
extraneous cases and potentially dilutes his findings.  
Given their focus on whether TJ increases the risk of conflict 
resumption, Lie et al.68 and Melander69  rightly focus only on post-
conflict countries. Both further limit their sample. Melander, for 
example, looks only at the durability of peace following formal peace 
agreements. As a result, his findings should be read with this more 
limited applicability in mind. In addition, both he and Lie et al. 
                                                 
65 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”  
66 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”  
67 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
68 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice.”  
69 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”  
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require at least two years of non-violence between conflict years 
before the country would enter the sample. While not unreasonable, 
the choice reduces the study’s ability to say something about the 
dynamics in the immediate aftermath of conflict termination. While 
Lie et al. use Uppsala/PRIO data to determine their sample of post-
conflict societies, it is possible that their number of post-conflict 
societies is inflated because the Uppsala/PRIO data has conflict 
dyads of governments and an armed opposition group as its unit of 
analysis.  This means that if a government is at war with several 
different factions, each of these conflicts may be coded as a separate 
conflict dyad. Given the fact that they do not report their data, it is 
difficult to ascertain how this issue is addressed.  Meernik et al., by 
contrast, do not suffer from the problem of multiple dyads, as they 
measure the presence or absence of internal war in a given state in a 
given year.70 
Another illustration of the significance of sampling can be 
seen by comparing the findings of Meernik et al.71 and Kim and 
Sikkink. Although they define human rights trials according to the 
same parameters, Meernik et al.’s results are not as optimistic. Rather, 
they find that domestic human rights trials and international tribunals 
after civil war have had no effect on subsequent human rights 
practices. How do we explain the contrasting findings of Meernik et 
al. and Kim and Sikkink, when both use the same definition for 
human rights trials? For one, the sampling strategies for transitional 
societies are different. Kim and Sikkink72 consider countries going 
through three types of transitions: from autocracy to democracy, 
from war to peace, and transition by state creation. Meernik et al., by 
contrast, focus exclusively on post-civil war trials. Even beyond that, 
there is a major difference in the number of post-civil war states in 
the two studies’ samples. Kim and Sikkink determine their sample by 
using the Polity IV data set; they code 16 states as transitioning from 
civil war. Meernik et al., using Uppsala/PRIO, find a total of 82 post-
                                                 
70 Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”  
71 Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”  
72 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect,” 178.  
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civil war states.  The much higher number of post-civil war states in 
Meernik et al. is due to the fact that Uppsala/PRIO’s definition is 
one in which there are at least 25 battle deaths in a dyadic conflict in 
which at least one actor is a state actor.  As a result of using what this 
dataset defines as a civil war, several states that had very short 
periods of civil war (e.g., Kenya, 20 days; Moldova, 7 months; 
Lesotho, 2 ½ months) are included in their sample of post-civil war 
states (see Appendix C for comparative post-civil war data). 
The much smaller number of post-civil war transitions in the 
Kim and Sikkink73 data can be addressed in part because some of the 
states that they code as having a transition by state creation 
(Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Macedonia, Croatia, Moldova, etc.) also had civil 
wars after the new state emerged.  While Kim and Sikkink code 
Bosnia in both the transition from civil war (1995-) and transition of 
state creation (1992-) categories, many other states that had a civil 
war after state creation are not included in the transition from civil 
war category.  In addition, as Meernik et al.’s data from 
Uppsala/PRIO illustrates, many of these civil conflicts were small in 
scope. Finally, some states in the Kim and Sikkink data (such as 
Azerbaijan in 1992, Guatemala in 1984) are coded as having 
democratic transitions while they were in the middle of civil wars, 
according to the data from Uppsala/PRIO. In sum, scholars need to 
be cautious in how they construct their samples to bolster the quality 
of their inferences. Moreover, academics have to be wary of the non-




Finally, the studies under review employ a variety of statistical 
techniques. These methodological choices are made to strengthen the 
robustness and validity of statistical findings. Yet, these choices have 
implications for how effectively the model can account for real-world 
causal processes. Methodological choices also have implications as to 
                                                 
73 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”  
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the studies’ unit of analysis. As we shall see, these questions have 
been dealt with in a variety of ways.  
Arguably, Olsen et al. provide the simplest model.74 They take 
the political transition as their unit of analysis (91 transitions in total) 
and compare human rights and democracy scores at the transition 
with five and ten years after. However, they fail to account for when 
TJ is implemented in that five or ten year period. Essentially, 
therefore, regardless of when it is implemented, TJ gets ‘credit’ for 
the five or ten year change in human rights or democracy as if TJ had 
been implemented right at the transition. Taking five or ten year 
snapshots can mask significant fluctuations, which are lost in this 
framework.  In their model, Olsen et al. include controls such as 
GDP per capita, time since transition, levels of democracy, and 
regional dummies, but leave out others such as conflict involvement 
that previous quantitative research on human rights and democracy 
have found important.75  
Kim and Sikkink76 and Wiebelhaus-Brahm77, by contrast, 
employ cross-national time-series techniques, using the country-year 
as their unit of analysis. They are able to control for country-specific 
factors that might be influencing results. Both studies also employ 
two-stage estimation techniques that help researchers control for 
endogeneity; in other words, the possibility that an alleged effect of 
TJ was actually caused by an antecedent condition that produced TJ 
and the outcome of interest. While arguably an improvement, these 
models too are only as good as the data behind them. Several 
variables that theoretically should be included as a control or in the 
first stage equation, such as the nature of the political 
                                                 
74 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
75 Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate, “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity 
in the  
1980s: A Global Analysis,” American Political Science Review 88.4 (1994):853-872;  
Steven Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith, “Repression of the Human Right 
to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 
1976-1993,” International Studies Quarterly 43.2 (1999): 291-313.  
76 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”  
77 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.  
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transition/balance of forces, are omitted due to a lack of cross-
national data. Moreover, they do not control for the presence of 
other TJ mechanisms. 
Because they are interested in the propensity of states that 
employ TJ to see a resumption of conflict, Lie et al.78 employ an 
events history model, namely a Cox Proportional Hazards Model. 
Theoretically, this makes great sense as the technique allows the 
researcher to examine whether the ‘treatment’, in this case TJ, 
increases or decreases the probability of conflict recurrence. The unit 
of analysis is the duration of the peace spell following a cessation of 
conflict. It is superior to limited dependent variable techniques, like 
logit and probit, which is used by Meernik et al.79 and Melander80, 
because these latter approaches assume that each observation is 
independent.  
However, Lie et al.’s approach may artificially inflate the 
number of cases in their sample, as they disaggregate their data into 
‘peace years’, which starts the first day of peace after conflict and 
ends December 31 the same year; the problem with their 
methodology is that subjects enter the dataset again on the first day 
of peace after the resumed conflict ends.  They employ a duration 
variable measuring the length of the post-conflict peace period, 
measured in days represented from the first day of peace to the first 
day when the conflict again passes the 25 battle-related deaths 
threshold.  This is a problem because there are many countries that 
have several peace agreements signed before lasting peace occurs, so 
the number of post-conflict societies as defined by this sample (200 
in total) may be exaggerated. This potential problem could be solved 
by controlling for conflict proneness.  
 
Conclusions: Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide? 
This growing quantitative literature has been met with significant 
criticism. Two challenges we have discussed, the measurement 
                                                 
78 Lie et al, “Post-Conflict Justice.”  
79 Meernik et al., “The Impact of International Tribunals.”  
80 Melander, “Justice or Peace?”  
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problem and modeling causal relationships, are frequently pointed 
out. More generally, critics charge, quantitative studies fail to account 
for the unique nature of each country’s TJ experience. As one set of 
critics argue, large-N cross-national time-series studies fail to account 
for “changes in the [global] normative context” over time and for 
“local contextual factors.”81 Some quantitative studies do seek to 
control for world-historical context and we have discussed some 
attempts to account for local context. Nonetheless, cross-national 
studies necessarily sacrifice detail for generalizability. Quantitative 
studies may be attributing causality to formal TJ processes in part 
because they cannot hope to control for all local factors.  
Ben-Josef Hirsch et al.82 charge that large-N studies are 
inherently biased by “presuming or predetermining the goals” of TJ. 
It is the case that quantitative research has selected dependent 
variables that are measurable through existing datasets. Not only 
might it be difficult to construct a convincing causal argument for a 
relationship, but these measures reflect an implicitly Western 
conception of rights and justice that neglects deeper structural, 
socioeconomic issues. Yet, in their critique, critics seem to sometimes 
confuse goals, or measuring success, with measuring impact, which 
could be considered distinct. Success relates to TJ mechanisms 
achieving the goals set out for them by their creators, whereas impact 
refers to the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of 
TJ processes.83 Quantitative studies have generally tested cause-effect 
claims about various TJ mechanisms and a variety of areas of impact 
that have been asserted for years. More generally, while 
acknowledging these challenges, we reject the claim that quantitative 
methodologies are worthless for understanding the impact of TJ. 
                                                 
81 Ben-Josef Hirsch et al., “Measuring the Impacts of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions,” 395-396.  
82 Ben-Josef Hirsh et al., “Measuring the Impact of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions,” 398.  
83 Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,” 17-19.  
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Frankly, the field as a whole benefits from a mixed methods 
research program.84 Quantitative approaches are well-suited to 
aggregating large amounts of data and parsing out patterns of 
behavior over time and space. Qualitative research, by contrast, 
provides us with intimate case details that allow for the identification 
and tracing of causal processes. As such, qualitative and quantitative 
methods are actually quite complementary. Together, both 
approaches are important in advancing knowledge and putting TJ 
policy on more sound footing. Based on our survey of the 
quantitative literature, we offer a few recommendations for future TJ 
research.  
A first issue relates to the scope of these findings. As we have 
seen, studies have drawn their samples in different ways to examine 
different types of transitional periods.  This is appropriate, but 
researchers and consumers need to be cautious of overgeneralizing 
about what the findings mean in policy terms. This speaks, in part, to 
broader debates in the field about whether the term TJ, which 
emerged to characterize transitions from authoritarian rule, is 
applicable to transitions from war to peace. One benefit of 
quantitative methods is that variation in transition is something for 
which we can control to explore how much (or how little) these cases 
have in common.   
Second, the question of the causal mechanisms through 
which TJ effects outcomes needs further exploration. To focus 
specifically on human rights, while Kim and Sikkink85 argue that 
human rights prosecutions lower levels of repression through 
deterrence and norm diffusion, future research needs to empirically 
determine whether or not this is the case. Doing so will help to 
answer important sampling dilemmas, such as whether trials should 
only be coded if a verdict is reached86 or if the entire process 
including indictments, arrests, trials, etc. should be coded.  Likewise, 
                                                 
84 P. Pham and P. Vinck, “Empirical Research and the Development and 
Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 1..2 (2007): 234-235.  
85 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrent Effect.”  
86 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
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future empirical research into the role that truth commissions play in 
norm diffusion can help to determine which sampling strategies are 
best in regards to whether only those truth commissions that hold 
public hearings or that see their reports publicly released should be 
coded, or if all truth commissions that begin their work should be 
coded. However, as Mendeloff notes, the concept of norm diffusion 
is difficult to empirically examine and may require great 
methodological sophistication.87 We lack adequate cross-national 
measures to distinguish the two causal mechanisms so progress will 
likely need to come through qualitative research. 
 One prominent way through which norm diffusion 
potentially occurs is through the efforts of external actors. As such, 
their role in post-conflict and transitional societies may serve as a 
valuable predictor for which types of TJ mechanisms are employed. 
This speaks to the issue of selection effects. Recent literature has 
made some headway in regards to figuring out why states choose the 
TJ measures that they do. This new research paradigm is important 
for understanding the normative implications of TJ, because if certain 
post-conflict scenarios (such as the involvement of the United 
Nations) create conditions that are riper for (particular types of) TJ, 
these measures may play a critical role in the emergence of post-
conflict human rights norms. For example, the involvement of non-
governmental and inter-governmental organizations is a significant 
predictor of whether TJ measures are implemented in post-conflict 
societies.88 Interestingly, the involvement of the United Nations in 
post-conflict societies is significant for predicting the implementation 
of human rights prosecutions, truth commissions, amnesty and other 
TJ measures. This is significant, because the presence of international 
organizations in post-conflict societies may help establish norms that 
emphasize accountability for human rights abuses. While this is 
speculation, it is important to note that better understanding of the 
normative implications of TJ may require treating the emergence of 
                                                 
87 Mendeloff, “Deterrence, Norm Socialization.”  
88 Dawn L. Rothe and Scott Maggard, “Factors that Impede or Facilitate Post-
Conflict Justice Mechanisms?” International Criminal Law Review 12.2 (2012): 193-
217; Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 79-96.  
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TJ as the dependent variable because there are certain variables that 
increase the likelihood of TJ processes being created. As such, the 
quantitative studies that seek to control for antecedent conditions in 
an attempt to isolate causality on the part of TJ are on the right track. 
However, as Olsen et al. note, future research needs to uncover the 
precise role that external involvement plays in influencing which TJ 
mechanisms are employed.  A mixed-methods approach may be most 
useful for understanding this complex process.   
Third, research should address the role of timing and 
sequencing of TJ mechanisms. Many studies treat individual TJ 
mechanisms in isolation. Yet, states frequently employ multiple 
mechanisms, whether simultaneously or in sequence. Quantitative 
studies haven’t effectively dealt with this. Interaction terms have 
rarely been used, but would allow the researcher to examine the 
cumulative effects when more than one mechanism has been utilized. 
Timing and sequencing is a more difficult modeling challenge. TJ 
mechanisms may or may not be implemented when political 
transitions occur, but quantitative studies typically implicitly assume 
that they are. Moreover, TJ mechanisms may be implemented in 
different orders in different countries. This order likely matters for 
their individual and collective impact, but quantitative studies have 
not adequately dealt with this. 
Finally, further research should focus on specific elements of 
TJ processes. Future research on human rights prosecutions should 
measure the impact of specific elements of the prosecution process 
on the dependent variable, for example. Meernik89 is a good starting 
point in this line of research, as he measures the impact of certain 
elements of ICTY trial processes (captures, surrenders, transfers to 
The Hague, and judgments) involving key figures in the Bosnian 
conflict (Slobodan Milosevic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic, 
Rahim Ademi, Sefer Halilovic, Naser Oric, Tihomir Blaskic, Dario 
Kordic and Mario Cerkez) on societal peace in Bosnia.  While his 
measures on the dependent variable are limited to Bosnia, his 
                                                 
89 James Meernik, “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal 
Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia,” Journal of Peace Research 42.3 (2005): 271-289. 
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methodological approach may be utilized elsewhere and, with the loss 
of some qualitative information, even be applied cross-nationally. 
Such an approach would enable the quantitative literature to move 
away from treating TJ as a dichotomous variable. A similar approach 
could be taken to explore key elements of other TJ processes, such as 
truth commission public hearings or the expiration of amnesty offers. 
Through such efforts, future research could better understand the 
impact of specific elements of TJ processes on variables such as 
human rights.  
The second wave of quantitative research has the potential to 
move the field in this direction. The newly released Transitional 
Justice Research Collaborative and Justice Data Project are marked 
advances over the early datasets.90 Both include more qualitative data 
on TJ processes to enable researchers to make their own theoretical 
judgments about how to account for TJ variation in their 
measurement and sampling choices. Ultimately, this could provide 
important policy recommendations by speaking to specific design 
elements of TJ processes. 
 






Olsen et al. 
2010 




Argentina x x 
Bangladesh  x 
Benin x x 
Bolivia x x 
Bosnia x x 
Bulgaria x x 
Burundi x 
 Cambodia x 
                                                  
90 See https://transitionaljusticedata.com/ and http://www.justice-data.com/. 
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Chad x 
 Chile x x 
DRC x 
 Republic of the Congo  x 
Cote d'Ivoire  x 
Croatia x x 
Czechoslovakia  x 
Czech Rep x x 





El Salvador x x 




















Guatemala x x 




Haiti  x x 
Honduras x 
 Hungary x x 
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Lithuania x x 
Macedonia x x 
Madagascar  x 
Malawi x x 
Mali x x 








Namibia x x 
Nicaragua x x 










Panama x x 
Papua New Guinea  x 
Paraguay x x 
Peru x x 
Philippines  x 
Poland x x 
Portugal x 
 Romania x x 
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Rwanda x x 
Senegal x x 
Serbia and Montenegro x x 





 South Africa x x 
South Korea x x 












Uruguay x x 
United Kingdom  x 
United States  x 
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Pakistan     x 
Uganda 1974 x    x 
Zambia 1975     x 
India     x 
Bolivia x x x x x 
Argentina x x x x x 
Kenya     x 
Honduras     x 
Uruguay 1985 x  x x x 
Zimbabwe x  x  x 
Philippines   x x x 
Uganda 1986 x x x x x 
Ghana 1989     x 
Chile 1990 x x x x x 
Czech Republic     x 
Nepal x x x x x 
South Africa 1990     x 
Chad x x x x x 
Lithuania 1991     x 
South Africa 1991     x 
El Salvador x x x x x 
Germany x x x x x 
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Zambia 1993     x 
Sri Lanka 1994 x x x  x 
Sudan     x 
Brazil     x 
Burundi 1995 x   x x 
Haiti x x x x x 
Mexico 1995     x 
South Africa 1995 x x x x x 
Ecuador 1996 x x x x x 
Guatemala x x x x x 
Sweden     x 
Burkina Faso     x 
Lithuania 1998     x 
Indonesia    x x 
Nigeria x x x x x 
Rwanda 1999     x 
Rwanda 1999-2000     x 
Lebanon 2000     x 
Malaysia     x 
Poland     x 
South Korea 2000-2     x 
South Korea 2000-4   x x x 
Uruguay 2000  x x  x 
Grenada  x    
Jamaica     x 
Lebanon 2001     x 
Mexico 2001     x 
Panama  x x x x 
Peru  x x x x 
Sri Lanka     x 
Thailand     x 
Zambia 2001     x 
East Timor  x x x x 
Ghana 2002  x x x x 
Serbia and  x x x x 
33
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Montenegro 
Sierra Leone  x x x x 
CAR    x x 
Chile 2003     x 
Paraguay  x x x x 
DRC  x x x x 
Lebanon 2004     x 
Morocco  x x  x 
Colombia     x 
Indonesia 2005  x    
Indonesia-East 
Timor     x 
Lebanon 2005     x 
Liberia 2005  x x x x 
Bosnia     x 
Sri Lanka 2006     x 
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Afghanistan x x 
Angola x x 
Azerbaijan x 
 Bangladesh x 
 Bosnia x x 
Burkina Faso x 
 Burundi x x 
Cambodia x 
 Cameroon x 




Comoros x x 
Republic of Congo x 
 Cote d'Ivoire x 
 Croatia x 




 Egypt x 
 El Salvador x 
 Equatorial Guinea x 
 Eritrea x 
 Ethiopia x x 
Gambia x 
 Georgia x 
 Ghana x 




Stewart and Wiebelhaus-Brahm: Quantitative Transitional Justice Research







Brandon Stewart and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm   132 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 97-133 
 
India x 
 Indonesia x 
 Iran x 
 Iraq x x 
Israel x 
 Kenya x 
 Laos x 
 Lebanon x x 
Lesotho x x 
Liberia x x 
Macedonia x 
 Malaysia x 
 Mali x 
 Mauritania x 
 Mexico x 
 Moldova x 
 Morocco x 
 Mozambique x 
 Myanmar x 
 Nepal x 
 Nicaragua x 
 Niger x 
 Nigeria x 
 Pakistan x 
 Panama x 
 Papua New Guinea x 
 Paraguay x 
 Peru x 
 Philippines x 
 Romania x 
 Russia x 
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Rwanda x x 
Saudi Arabia x 
 Senegal x 
 Serbia and Montenegro x 





 South Africa x 
 Spain x 
 Sri Lanka x 
 Sudan x 
 Suriname x 
 Syria x 
 Tajikistan x 
 Thailand x 
 Togo x 
 Trinidad and Tobago x 
 Tunisia x 
 Turkey x 
 Uganda x 
 United Kingdom x 
 Uzbekistan x 
 Venezuela x 
 Yemen Arab Republic x 
 Yemen People's Republic x 
 Zaire x 
 Zimbabwe x 
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